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If there is a situation undermining the rule of law, then it is exactly this: The
Bundesbank is under a legal obligation to ignore the PSPP Judgment of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht (under EU law), and the Bundesbank is under a legal
obligation to follow the PSPP Judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (under
German constitutional law). How has it come to this?
When confronted with the question of the supremacy of EU law over national
constitutions, the ECJ on the one hand and national constitutional courts, especially
the Bundesverfassungsgericht, on the other, have always represented irreconcilable
positions. Nevertheless, they managed to prevent a clash that would have damaged
the entire integration process. This was not just mere judicial courtesy: the existing
détente reflected the reality that none of the actors could claim to be ultimately
right simply because deciding between right and wrong is dependent on the point
of departure one is choosing. The positions are well known and have not changed
since the beginning.
1. The ECJ Perspective
For the ECJ, supremacy has been a direct and inevitable consequence of the special
nature of EU law at the outset. Already in Costa v ENEL the ECJ made it clear
that EU law “an independent source of law, could not, because of its special and
original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without
being deprived of its character as community law and without the legal basis of the
community itself being called into question” (emphasis added). It is by no surprise
that the exact same wording is used in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (para. 3)
to justify the supremacy of EU law over national constitutions. Later cases involving
a conflict of EU law with national norms of constitutional rank no longer used the
specific term “nature” (Factortame II (para. 22): effectiveness of EU law, Melloni
(para. 63): efficacy of the framework decision), but the underlying idea has remained
the same: without full and unconditional supremacy EU law would no longer be what
it is supposed to be. 
Naturally, in order to immunise the EU legal system from national constitutional
challenges, its special nature must inevitably encompass its autonomy from
the domestic legal systems. Only if EU law and EU law itself can determine the
rules pertaining to its relationship with the domestic legal system, can national
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constitutional reservations be deemed irrelevant in case of a conflict. Such autonomy
has been stipulated right from the beginning, albeit without elaborating its meaning.
Its first mention can be tied already to the era of the European Coal and Steel
Community, where advocate General Legrange’s 1956 Opinion in Mirrosevich v High
Authority (ECLI:EU:C:1956:9, p. 399), described the nature of the law of ESCS as
possessing an autonomous character. While the original French version used the
term ‘autonome’, it was translated to English as ‘independent’, taking the edge out
of the term. In Van Gend en Loos the ECJ refrained from using the term autonomy
and referred rather to “a new legal order of international law”, but Costa v ENEL and
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft were based on the premise that the founding
treaties of the EEC emanate from an ‘independent source’ – “une source autonome”.
From time to time ever since, the ECJ confirms (here at para. 166) that autonomy
and supremacy are specific characteristic arising from the very nature of EU law.
2. The Bundesverfassungsgericht Perspective
The Bundesverfassungsgericht has remained more subtle in its argument and
has not so far invoked the nature of the Grundgesetz as ‘constitution’ expressly.
Nevertheless, the underlying premise does follow from the supposed characteristic
of the constitution being the sole source of all public authority for those under
the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Germany. This characteristic is
necessary to postulate the theory of constitutional authorisation (Theorie der
verfassungsrechtlichen Ermächtigung), a theory on which all constitutional
reservations towards EU law are based. Only if we accept that sovereign powers
can be exercised in Germany solely on the basis of the Grundgesetz, can we
claim – as the Bundesverfassungsgericht does – that EU law is applied because
the Grundgesetz commands so. In other words, the gatekeeper function of the
Grundgesetz follows directly from the nature of the same Grundgesetz being the
foundation of all public authority in Germany.
This character of a constitution might seem self-evident in a state-centred
constitutional theory, nevertheless it runs counter the realities of a supranational
organisation. What is more, it does not even follow from the wording of Article 24
of the Grundgesetz, the integration clause in force at the time the fundamental
rights reservation was first framed in Solange I. On the contrary, as recognised
by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Solange I (at para. 43), Article 24 (1) of
the Grundgesetz expressly provides for the possibility of transfer of ‘sovereign
powers’ (“Hoheitsrechte übertragen”) to international organisations. In fact, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht had to go at length to argue that the language of Article
24 (1) GG must be interpreted in the context of the entire constitution, already
then referring to the identity of the Grundgesetz. This interpretation allowed for the
conclusion that “Article 24 GG does not actually authorise the transfer of sovereign
powers, rather it opens the national legal order (with the stated limitations).” This
denial of the possibility of actual transfer of sovereign powers has remained
the basis of all future constitutional reservations, even though the language of
the new integration clause, Article 23 introduced in 1992 equally authorises the
transfer of sovereign powers. The Lisbon Judgment (at para. 226 ff.) attempts
to distinguish between sovereign powers (“Hoheitsrechte”) and sovereignty, but
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this distinction fails to explain why the autonomous EU legal system shall remain
“derived” (abgeleitet) (at para. 231) in the sense that it cannot take precedence over
the national constitution in those areas where sovereign powers have already been
transferred. 
The comprehensive and exclusive nature of the constitution and its resulting
gatekeeper function vis-à-vis EU law allows for transforming questions of
interpretation of EU law into constitutional questions, a keen aspiration of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht ever since Maastricht. The ultra vires reservation
triggered in the PSPP judgment is doing exactly this. Even if the boundaries
of the competences of EU institutions follow from the founding treaties, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht claims the power to ultimately adjudicate about these
because, in the eyes of Karlsruhe, it is ultimately a German constitutional issue.
The argument leading to this conclusion through the right to vote as well as the
principles of democracy and popular sovereignty is more than complicated (to put
it mildly), especially in relation to an independent institution, like the ECB. But even
if (supposedly) we are ready to accept the twists and turns of the reasoning of the
PSPP judgment, they only hold true if we also accept that Germany never gave
away sovereign rights, only competences ultimately limited by the Grundgesetz.
The above is not to say that the theory of constitutional authorisation is per se false,
untrue or illogical. And we cannot say that about the autonomist view either. Leaving
aside the actual German PSPP judgment and the respective ECJ judgment, both
positions could be doctrinally coherent if we accepted their respective premises. The
choice between the two perspectives, at the end of the day, rests on a Werturteil
in a Weberian sense, or on a political choice just like Kelsen described the choice
between primacy of international law and primacy of domestic law.
3. The Lack of Mutually Accepted Rules on Norm
Collision
That no actual conflict has erupted from these irreconcilable positions can be
thanked to the clever judicial politics of Karlsruhe and Luxemburg which tried to
accommodate the basic needs of the competing actor without compromising their
own theoretical foundations. The best and probably most beneficial example of this
wisdom is the Solange II judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which also
became the model of the Bosphorus presumption governing the relationship of EU
law and the ECHR.
The conflict can doctrinally be conceptualised either from an ECJ perspective or
from a Bundesverfassungsgericht perspective. From the ECJ perspective, there is
a clear doctrinal answer: as the PSPP judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht
is itself just a national legal act, in case of conflict (which is obviously given
here) it is inapplicable, therefore the Bundesbank clearly has to ignore the
Bundesverfassungsgericht judgment (and even an infringement procedure is
possible against Germany). Also from the Bundesverfassungsgericht perspective,
there is a clear doctrinal answer: the PSPP judgment has clarified the limits of
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the supremacy of EU law (again), so the respective ECJ judgment is inapplicable,
therefore the Bundesbank clearly has to ignore the ECJ judgment. The respective
collision rules of EU law and German law have always contradicted each other, there
have never been mutually accepted (doctrinal or codified) rules on norm collision.
All eyes are on the Bundesbank now. In its first reaction, the Bundesbank expressed
hopes that the problem will just go away and the ECB will do what is required by
the Bundesverfassungsgericht. The ECB, however, seems totally unimpressed and
considers the German judgment as non-binding. Time is ticking for the Bundesbank:
the most likely scenario at the moment when we are writing this blogpost is that the
three months deadline (which was set by the Bundesverfassungsgericht) will pass,
and the Bundesbank will have to make a choice. Whatever the Bundesbank will do,
it will be unlawful: exiting PSPP will breach EU law, staying in it will breach German
law. But even if for some miraculous reason the actual collision situation could be
avoided (a sudden major reform finishing PSPP), the old paradigm about handling
norm collisions is gone. 
The question, whether the Bundesverfassungsgericht judgment was doctrinally well-
argued is equally irrelevant for this problem (for convincing sceptical voices, see
here, here and here), just like it is irrelevant whether the former ECJ judgment was
doctrinally well-argued. The issue is not how convincing the reasoning in any of the
judgments is. This is now about the rule of law in a situation where legal obligations
conflict each other at the highest level without mutually agreed collision rules. In
this context, the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s step looks more like starting a chicken
game.
The PSPP judgment is not a new turn primarily because it would invent a new
doctrine or because it would deviate from the existing case law (even though some
doctrinal steps in the reasoning are quite surprising: we would like to avoid the stark
terms that the Bundesverfassungsgericht used about the ECJ judgment). Nor it is
new in the sense the Bundesverfassungsgericht never forbade to fulfil an obligation
under EU law: this boundary was already crossed in 2015 in relation to the execution
of a European arrest warrant. It is a turn mainly because it is flagrantly giving up on
a paradigm that ensured peace between two of the most important courts in Europe.
The paradigm that maintaining one’s theoretical position can be combined with a
practical way of living together. The paradigm that the rule of law is diminished if
state agencies are exposed to contradicting legal obligations both seeking to be
supreme over the competing one, and the agencies are forced to make a choice that
will inevitably be illegal, one way or another. Duly noted, this paradigm has never
been of doctrinal nature. It was clever judicial politics in order to preserve important
constitutional values and European integration at the same time. It is unclear, what
strategic goal the Bundesverfassungsgericht wanted to achieve with the PSPP
judgment. It is, however, more than likely that this new sort of judicial politics will
equally hurt European integration and the rule of law. 
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